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INTRODUCTION 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property1 famously sets out 
two, apparently contradictory, lines of thought.2 One line, set out in Books 
II and III, resonates comfortably with today’s shareholder-centered 
corporate legal theory. Here, the book teaches that management duties 
should be intensified in the wake of separated ownership and control: 
managers should be viewed as trustees for the shareholders and should 
exercise their wide-ranging powers for the shareholders’ benefit.3 The 
other line of thought emerges in Books I and IV, where The Modern 
Corporation encases this shareholder trust model in discussions of 
corporate power and social welfare, discussions that resonate today with 
those who advocate stepped-up government regulation of corporate 
conduct and corporate social responsibility. Here, the separation of 
ownership and control implies public responsibilities. The rhetoric flies 
high: “[I]t is entirely possible . . . that the corporate profit stream in reality 
no longer is private property, and that claims on it must be adjusted by 
some test, other than that of property right.”4 The “rigid enforcement of 
property rights” of passive shareholders would have to give way to a 
“convincing system of community obligations.”5 Management, moreover, 
must develop into a “purely neutral technocracy.”6 In order to meet these 
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technocratic obligations, corporate leaders should “set forth a program 
comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their 
public, and stabilization of business.”7 
In previous work, Michael Wachter and I have shown that The 
Modern Corporation’s contradictions can be explained by reference to the 
context in which it was written.8 The book had a long gestation, spanning 
the late 1920s, the Crash, and the early years of the Great Depression. 
Many, including Berle, reordered their political economic views during 
those years. The Modern Corporation’s various parts capture Berle at 
different points in the timeline, beginning in the boom years as a friend of 
the shareholders, and ending in the depths of the Depression as an advocate 
of corporate advancement of national social welfare policies. Indeed, Berle 
emerged as a leading figure in the national debate over the appropriate 
policy response to the economic crisis, a debate just getting started upon 
the book’s publication in the spring of 1932. Many looked to Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt not only to win that year’s election but also to follow 
the lead of many European leaders of the time and adopt corporatism as 
the political economy of the United States. Berle, who joined FDR’s inner 
circle during the 1932 campaign, was a leading advocate of a corporatist 
approach.9 Wachter and I show that The Modern Corporation’s most 
famous sequence, a final chapter (Book IV, Chapter IV), entitled “The 
New Concept of the Corporation,”10 extensively overlaps the “New 
Individualism” speech that Berle (and his wife Beatrice) wrote for FDR.11 
The speech, the most radical of the 1932 campaign,12 presaged the 
economic program of the New Deal, in particular the corporatist National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) enacted in June 1933.13 
This essay casts additional light on The Modern Corporation’s 
corporatist precincts, shifting attention to the book’s junior coauthor, 
Gardiner C. Means. Means is accurately remembered as the generator of 
Book I’s statistical showings—the description of deepening corporate 
concentration and widening separation of ownership and control. He is 
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otherwise more notable for his absence than his presence in today’s 
discussions of The Modern Corporation. This essay fills this gap, 
describing the junior coauthor’s central concern—a theory of administered 
prices set out in a Ph.D. dissertation Means submitted to the Harvard 
economics department after the book’s publication. 
The pricing theory articulated in the dissertation is barely alluded to 
in The Modern Corporation, amounting to a sort of missing chapter. This 
essay is on very good authority in so characterizing the material, for it 
takes its cue from Means himself. In 1982, Means recorded his own 
reflections on the book’s meaning, both as of the time of publication and 
in retrospect. The occasion was a conference marking the book’s fiftieth 
anniversary held at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University on 
November 19 and 20.14 There, Means explained that corporate 
concentration presented a problem of vastly greater magnitude than did 
separated ownership and control and that the book’s central points could 
be found not in the trust model or the descriptions of management 
defalcation, but in an opaque passage at the end of Book I, Chapter III,15 a 
passage that becomes intelligible only by reference to Means’s 
dissertation. 
For Means, the book and the dissertation were a single project. The 
book’s statistical chapters went on to make up the lion’s share of the 
dissertation. The theory of administered prices, omitted from the book but 
included as the final part of the dissertation, lays out the statistical results’ 
implications for public policy. It amounted to a new description of the 
economy’s pricing mechanism, a description built on a skeptical 
evaluation of the economy’s self-corrective capability. Means believed 
Adam Smith’s picture of supply, demand, and automatic market correction 
had been partially eclipsed by inflexible pricing administered by corporate 
managers. Growing corporate concentration exacerbated these 
“administrated” prices’ distortionary effects.16 Means’s theory explained 
the Great Depression’s persistence and yielded a detailed list of problems 
to be addressed by a new regulatory state.17 Reference to the dissertation 
explains in hard economic terms why the authors thought private property 
needed to be pushed aside and just what they thought that “neutral 
technocrats” could do to enhance social welfare. 
Means would continue to refine his theory of administered prices for 
the rest his career in the teeth of objections raised by more conventional 
economists, both neoclassical and neo-Keynesian. The book project set the 
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pattern of mainstream rejection: even as Means did receive a Ph.D. from 
Harvard in 1933, his committee rejected the dissertation’s theoretical 
part.18 
Part I reconstructs the scene at the Hoover conference based on the 
papers and comments later published in the Journal of Law and 
Economics. It was a hothouse occasion, with the Chicago tribe gathered to 
present work that took the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary to bury The 
Modern Corporation then and forever. They did not succeed, even as some 
of what they said resonates more loudly today than it did at the time the 
papers were given. Means, a non-Chicago minority of one on the 
publication list, stalwartly defended both the book and his later 
contributions in a paper that amounts to an eleven o’clock reprise of a life’s 
work. 
Part II turns the clock farther back to the time of The Modern 
Corporation’s composition and publication, describing the Berle–Means 
collaboration and taking a closer look at what Means brought to the table 
in the book’s Part I. The missing chapter is then sketched in by reference 
to the unpublished dissertation and its early-stage articulation of a theory 
of administered prices. The dissertation’s exposition delivers the reader to 
the same points made in Book IV, Chapter IV, providing an essential 
explication. 
Part III describes Means’s later career, comparing it to that of his 
erstwhile coauthor. Means was a civil servant, a practicing economist, an 
entrepreneur, and a consultant, but never an academic. His fortunes as an 
economist waned badly as the 1930s came to a close.19 Means was a 
planner, and the planners’ influence declined in the wake of the failure of 
the NIRA.20 They lost their place at the policy table at the end of the 
decade, eclipsed by neo-Keynesians advocating fiscal stimulus. Economic 
expansion after World War II meant further marginalization for Means, 
even as Berle made adjustments that kept him on the national political 
economic stage. 
Part IV takes up the last years of Means’s career, when he enjoyed a 
comeback due to an economy that stagnated even as inflation continued. 
The mainstream macroeconomists whose ministrations had consigned 
Means to the policy wilderness had no explanation for this “stagflation” 
and, as a result, fell into disrepute. Means, however, did have a theory. He 
had, back in the 1960s, reformulated his theory of administered prices to 
explain the stagflation phenomenon.21 This returns us to Stanford in 1982, 
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where Means gave a paper that described his diagnosis of and solution for 
stagflation.22 Ironically, inflation was fading and the stock market was 
signaling economic expansion even as Means spoke. These developments 
would in turn usher orthodox free market economics back to the forefront, 
a return from the policy wilderness to which the market had been 
consigned by The Modern Corporation a half century earlier. 
I. PALO ALTO, 1982 
The Hoover Institution conference featured such luminaries as 
George Stigler,23 Harold Demsetz,24 Eugene Fama, Michael Jensen,25 and 
Oliver Williamson,26 each in different ways pronouncing that the 
separation of ownership and control no longer presented a problem, if 
indeed it ever had. The thrust of the papers is that, contrary to Berle and 
Means’s thesis, free markets and corporate contracting work together to 
constrain management moral hazard. And, while ownership and control 
had indeed separated, no structural infirmity should be diagnosed as a 
result. Corporate control arrangements instead should be seen as rational 
solutions to problems arising in the course of complex production. 
Two conference papers launch direct attacks on The Modern 
Corporation, going back to the status quo at the time it was published and 
challenging its accuracy. One of these, from George Stigler and Claire 
Friedland,27 interposes a headlong empirical challenge to the proposition 
that self-perpetuating managers were in control and running their 
companies in a self-serving way.28 The paper draws on Means’s statistical 
arrangement of the country’s 200 largest companies into control categories 
based on stock ownership.29 Means cordoned off private ownership, 
majority shareholder control, and pyramiding into separate categories. He 
added a fourth “minority control” category, in which a stockholder held 
between 20% and 50% of the shares, and then put corporations that did 
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not fall into any of the categories into a fifth category called “management 
control.”30 In his final tally, Means showed that 44% of American 
corporations by number and 58% by value were under management 
control.31 
Stigler and Friedland tested the policy implications of Means’s 
numbers, taking executive salary data from three separate studies 
undertaken in the late 1920s and 1930s. Stigler and Friedland regressed 
the salaries on the logarithm of the corporations’ assets and a dummy 
variable for control type.32 Nothing that related the compensation 
arrangements to the control types emerged from any of the three data 
sets.33 The implication, said Stigler and Friedland, was that managers in 
control did not set their own salaries, as Berle and Means had implied.34 
Stigler and Friedland also gathered up statistics on corporate profitability 
from the same periods. They hypothesized that, under the Berle and Means 
analysis, the blockholder-controlled corporations should do better.35 
Regression of the profitability numbers on corporate assets and control 
types showed that control had a significant effect on performance in only 
one of five regressions, once again purportedly falsifying Berle and 
Means.36 
The second direct attack came from Robert Hessen, a Hoover 
Institution fellow.37 Hessen took Berle and Means to task for failing to 
discuss other forms of business organization. With large partnerships run 
by delegated managers, for example, there also was separation of 
management and investment.38 Berle and Means similarly ignored the 
property law doctrine applicable to noncorporate enterprise—joint 
ownership. Reference to the law of joint ownership showed that comingled 
property rights had been intrinsic to group enterprise long before the 
twentieth century. It followed that the developments highlighted by Berle 
and Means were matters of degree rather than changes in kind.39 The 
conclusion was that separation of ownership and control was an ordinary 
phenomenon in business enterprise; a phenomenon that, by itself, provided 
no justification for government regulation.40 
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Means made the comment on Hessen, shrugging off the paper with 
comments that applied equally to the attack by Stigler and Friedland. Said 
Means, by focusing only on the separation of ownership and control41 
Hessen was distorting the book’s message.42 The Modern Corporation, 
Means said, had never concluded that big, management-controlled 
corporations cannot be engines of efficiency. Neither did the book say that 
directors had no right to control corporate property they do not own, nor 
that the ownership of shares somehow falls outside of the private property 
system.43 Nor did the book purport to describe fundamental changes in the 
basic characteristics of business organizations, making Hessen’s attack 
irrelevant.44 
The question assayed in the book, according to Means, was instead 
whether public policies formulated in an era when enterprises had been 
small could be expected to continue to work well when a significant part 
of production was conducted by giant firms with dispersed owners.45 What 
mattered in the book, accordingly, was less the discussion of separated 
ownership and control than the discussion of increasing concentration—
Means’s showing that one-third of the national wealth lay in the hands of 
200 large corporations and projection that, given continuation of the 
present rate of growth of that relative share, seventy percent of economic 
activity would be carried on by 200 corporations by 1950.46 From this 
showing, said Means, the book concluded that the modern corporate 
economy had superseded the classical, Smithian picture of a successfully 
self-correcting market economy. New concepts of economic relations 
were needed.47 
Means suggested that an observer really interested in understanding 
The Modern Corporation should consult pages 45 to 46 thereof, which set 
forth a series of five points as a conclusion to the description of 
concentrating economic power in Book I, Chapter III.48 The points merit 
a close look. First came a recommendation about matters for future 
inquiry: we now needed to study the behavior of large producing units 
rather than the behavior of the economy’s small competitors.49 Second 
came an observation about competition—the nature of competition had 
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changed and duopoly now mattered more than classical free markets.50 
Third, the book noted that an increasing proportion of production was for 
“use” rather than for “sale,” implying that the profit motive was no longer 
driving decision making within producing companies.51 Fourth, the nature 
of capital had changed so as to be comprised more of going concern value 
than tangible asset value.52 Fifth, blind market forces no longer governed 
the economy and economic power was instead concentrated in a small 
number of hands, making corporations social institutions.53 
Cross-referencing Means’s comment at Hoover to pages 45 and 46 
leaves one in a typical Modern Corporation state of confusion; a condition 
akin to that experienced by a first-time reader of the vague sentences in 
Book IV, Chapter IV. The longer one looks at this fivefold assertion, the 
more questions one has. How exactly had the nature of competition 
changed? The reference to a “duopoly” that mattered more than the 
classical free market provided no explication because the “duopoly” was 
not otherwise defined in Book I, Chapter III. Why was it so important that 
big, vertically integrated companies now produced goods that they 
consumed themselves rather than producing everything for an exterior 
market? How did this somehow eliminate the constraints of product 
market competition? Since when did rising going concern values relative 
to asset values denude the profit motive of motivational force, making for 
a policy problem? And wasn’t that final reference to power in the hands 
of a few just the standard invocation against corporate bigness typical of 
mid-twentieth century antitrust? The book offers no answers to these 
questions. 
But Means did answer the questions elsewhere. The five-point list at 
the end of Book I, Chapter III was a gesture in the direction of the 
theoretical part of Means’s dissertation, the content of which is described 
in this essay’s next Part. 
II. NEW YORK, 1927–1933 
Adolf Berle first took up residence at Columbia Law School, where 
he would spend the rest of his career, in 1927.54 He started on a soft money 
basis, occupying an office and doing adjunct teaching at the business 
school while he waited for a permanent law school faculty line to become 
available.55 Interim support came from a Rockefeller Foundation grant for 
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a research project that eventually became The Modern Corporation.56 The 
grant stipulated an “interdisciplinary” study of corporations to be 
conducted with an economist.57 Berle chose Means, then a graduate 
student, later describing him as a “statistical and economic research 
assistant,”58 who contributed the book’s empirical studies of corporate 
concentration and dispersed share ownership. Berle eventually conceded 
co-authorship and one-third of the royalties.59 
Means, although a student, was only one year younger than Berle60 
and a family friend. Berle and Means were “old bunkmates” from their 
training at the army’s officer candidate school at Plattsburg, New York 
during World War I.61 Their respective spouses, Beatrice Bishop and 
Caroline Ware, had been undergraduate friends at Vassar. Bishop and 
Ware had remained close and jointly intervened to get Means onto the 
Rockefeller project.62 
Means’s interest in the workings of the economy is said to date from 
his experience as a relief organizer in post-war Turkey. He supervised a 
village of 1,000 orphans and there observed a market-dominated 
production process that perfectly manifested Adam Smith’s description of 
supply, demand, and price discovery.63 The interesting thing, for Means, 
was a marked contrast with what he understood of production and pricing 
in the United States.64 
Upon his return, Means studied at the Lowell Textile Institute65 and 
then went into business, starting up a factory that manufactured fine 
blankets, a business he ran from 1922 to 1929.66 Means found himself able 
to set product prices at will, deepening the sense of divergence between 
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Smith’s description and contemporary real-world operations.67 Multi-
tasking as he ran the blanket business, he enrolled in Harvard Business 
School. He there fell under the influence of W.Z. Ripley and emerged with 
a master’s degree in 1927.68 Enrollment in the doctoral program at Harvard 
followed immediately, even as Means also signed on with Berle at 
Columbia,69 with the work produced for the book substantially 
overlapping the chapters in the Ph.D. dissertation. Like Berle, Means 
worked on FDR’s 1932 presidential campaign.70 As noted above, the Ph.D. 
was duly granted in 1933 but only at the pain of the rejection of the 
dissertation’s theoretical discussion,71 the material obliquely referred to at 
the end of Part I, Chapter III of The Modern Corporation. 
Means titled the dissertation The Corporate Revolution. Its statistical 
part, like that of The Modern Corporation, demonstrated (1) that an 
increasing amount of economic activity is conducted by corporations, (2) 
that super-sized corporations played an increasing role, (3) that share 
ownership was increasingly dispersed, and (4) that an increasing number 
of large corporations were manager-managed.72 
The theoretical part of the dissertation described the implications of 
these findings for classical economic orthodoxy. In the orthodox picture, 
supply and demand set the prices of goods traded in free markets. There 
results a disciplined, self-correcting economic system in which upward 
swings automatically follow economic downturns caused by falling 
demand. External shocks occur but do not in the long run distort the 
system’s fundamental soundness; government intervention accordingly 
should be avoided.73 The Great Depression cast doubt on these confident 
predictions and the resulting noninterventionist prescription. 
Means posed an alternative approach. He had reached the conclusion 
that the orthodox picture, which worked well for the simple trading 
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situations he observed in Turkey, no longer accurately described the 
working of a complex modern economy.74 
His dissertation offered four broad points to this end. First, markets 
for many products no longer set prices, which were instead administered 
by corporate managers.75 Second, the costs of goods sold were no longer 
determined by the production process but were instead indeterminate.76 
Third, the process of saving and investment was now dualistic, with a 
corporate side and an individual side.77 And fourth, the profit motive no 
longer sufficed as an explanation for production activity.78 
A. The Administered Price and Administrative Competition 
The first point, the rise of the administered price, was primus inter 
pares. Means distinguished classical market pricing from modern 
corporate pricing. In the classical market, the price did not precede the 
trade but was instead determined by the trade as supply met demand.79 
Large corporations priced differently; managers would fix the price of the 
good in advance of the sale, and this “administered” (or “engineered”) 
price would stick for a period of time.80 As the corporate producing sector 
grew, prices in the overwhelming majority of conventional markets for 
manufactured goods became fixed over time. The product markets, as a 
result, ceased to equate supply and demand, except by coincidence.81 
It followed that pictures of economic activity in standard demand 
curves no longer were accurate, for they assumed perfect price flexibility 
where it did not necessarily exist.82 Not that supply and demand for a given 
product remained inflexibly apart forever. There would be a long run 
tendency for the proportionate discrepancy to decrease, but an absolute 
discrepancy would persist without decrease.83 
There was a stark follow-up point: a disequilibrium between supply 
and demand caused by a drop of demand did not result in a fall in price. 
Instead of lowering the price in response to a falling demand, a rational 
corporate manager would make an internal adjustment, cutting back on 
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levels of production and reducing levels of employment matters as to 
which flexibility had been retained.84 
Means’s discussion had a remarkable implication. Given the zone of 
administrative discretion he described, the choice to cut back on 
production instead of competing on price could even make the firm more 
valuable. The further implication was that, as Means had noted on page 45 
of The Modern Corporation, market competition had changed in 
character.85 It had become less intense as the various producing sectors 
became more and more concentrated86—Means would later call this 
“administrative competition.”87 The duopoly to which Means cryptically 
referred on page 45 now comes clearly into view. Means divided the 
economy into two sectors: one with traditional market-determined prices, 
the market for agricultural products being the prime example, and the other 
sector with administered prices.88 As the administered sector grew in 
relation to economy as whole, imbalance and instability resulted.89 
This analysis led directly to an explanation for the Great 
Depression’s depth and persistence. Means articulated it in a famous 
article published in 1935.90 In the classical picture of the economy, if 
demand fell but the money stock was constant, prices fell. The price drop 
increased the purchasing power of money, stimulating demand and 
restoring full employment. In the modern corporate economy, in contrast, 
inflexible prices prevented automatic correction from occurring in one-
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 87. Means, Corporate Power, supra note 86, at 470. 
 88. Id. at 467, 470. 
 89. Means, Corp. Revolution, supra note 72, at 143 (describing unemployment and the 
consequent falloff of demand). 
 90. Gardiner C. Means, Price Inflexibility and the Requirements of a Stabilizing Monetary 
Policy, 30 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 401, 405 (1935) [hereinafter Means, Price Inflexibility]. 
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half of the economy, retarding a return to stability.91 Means would call for 
monetary expansion as a corrective.92 
B. The Indeterminacy of Cost 
Let us now return to the thesis and its second point—the 
indeterminacy of product cost. This amounted to a more particular 
observation about the pricing process; an observation that underscored the 
picture of an administered price and its destabilization of classical 
economic assumptions. In the classical picture, price minus cost equals 
profit and the profit motive is the engine driving the economic train. 
Product cost and market price together determine production and 
employment decisions. To say that cost is indeterminate inserts managerial 
discretion into this basic equation, undercutting the motivational story and 
making the manager an independent decisionmaker. 
Means’s more particular case devolved on overhead charges. He 
characterized them as “joint costs,” meaning that the firm experienced 
them on an aggregate basis and not as attached to any particular product.93 
As he saw it, in a large operation, readily attributable product costs were 
at a minimum with a lot of the cost arbitrarily lumped into overhead (and 
depreciation), with these items representing a steadily rising proportion of 
overall costs.94 A producer would accordingly view the profit implications 
of a fall in demand on a firm-wide basis rather than tying its profit 
calculations to each unit of output produced. This insulated the producer’s 
economic behavior from determination by the price point in the market. 
C. Saving and Investment 
The third point—the duality of saving—divides the world into 
corporate savers and individual savers. The corporate savers invest in 
capital goods while the individual savers invest in interests in capital 
goods, also known as corporate stocks and bonds.95 The capital goods and 
the securities are priced in different markets. Distortionary effects follow: 
even though the value in both markets comes from the same capital goods, 
prices in the two markets could move in opposite directions—once again 
negating the standard account, in this case the one from macroeconomics. 
Means described a number of distorted scenarios. For example, he 
posited a negative shock that triggers a fall in demand and in prices. 
                                                     
 91. Means, Corporate Power, supra note 86, at 404. 
 92. Means, Price Inflexibility, supra note 90, at 409–13. 
 93. Means, Corp. Revolution, supra note 72, at 147–49 (setting out examples of cost accounting). 
 94. Id. at 146, 149–50. Numerous examples are offered: the cost of goods sold in a shoe store, 
id. at 147; a woolen mill, id. at 148–49; meatpacking, id. at 150. 
 95. Id. at 152–53. 
604 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:591 
Corporations, as a result, stop investing and issuing new securities. 
Meanwhile, individuals are still saving, bidding up the prices of a static 
supply of investment securities. Securities prices thus rise even as the 
economy stalls, until such time as savings decrease or corporations once 
again issue new securities.96 
Alternatively, Means posed that the shock and the cessation of 
corporate investment could cause savings to fall and force many 
individuals to consume out of their accumulated stocks of savings.97 
Downward pressure on stock prices would result. The value of the savings 
stock would fall with them, so that the savings retrenchment would not 
lead to an increase in the amount of goods actually consumed by 
individuals (and, by hypothesis, an economic recovery). Although the 
individuals had in substance invested their savings in corporate capital 
goods, the individuals had no way to access these investments directly for 
retrenchment purposes—their access was limited to firm-issued securities, 
the prices of which were falling below intrinsic value in a separate, 
disconnected market. Access to the real value of individual savings was 
being blocked by the separation of ownership and control: 
Only by the intermediary action of corporate control, would this be 
possible. If no such action by control occurs, the value of securities 
will melt away while the goods in which the securities represent an 
interest, though badly wanted by the community, will remain on the 
shelves of the corporation.98 
It seemed, then, that most important saving decisions being made in 
the economy were in the hands of corporate managers rather than saving 
individuals. The managers controlled not only the capital goods 
themselves but the decision as to the issuance of new securities for 
purchase by individual savers.99 Serious disequilibrium followed for the 
economy when the two markets failed to move in consonance.100 Indeed, 
Means’s scenario suggests an explanation for an apparently endless Great 
Depression following on the heels of a stock market crash. 
D. The Profit Motive 
Administered pricing and the separation of ownership and control, 
taken in conjunction, yield the fourth point, which concerns the profit 
motive. In the classical picture, the desire for profits motivates the 
entrepreneurs who produce the goods. Things work differently in the 
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modern corporation under separated ownership and control: the 
shareholder-owners take the profits even as they are unable to perform the 
function of monitoring to assure efficient operations. This breaks the logic 
of the classical picture, in which the firm and its profits “belong” to the 
shareholders.101 
Means surveyed the day’s cutting-edge theory of the firm, describing 
two opposing points of view. Profits were thought to have three 
components: return on invested capital, the wages of management, and a 
third residual category of “pure” profits.102 Some thought of pure profits 
as reward for risk taking and thus properly directed to the shareholders, 
while others saw pure profits as a reward for the “integrating force” of 
corporate leadership and thus properly directed to the managers.103 It 
followed that the profit motive that drove the classical entrepreneurial 
business had been separated.104 
Meanwhile, the law did not provide clear instructions as to an 
appropriate allocation of the profits. Corporate plundering had entered the 
fact pattern, as stressed in The Modern Corporation.105 Even so, Means 
downplayed the importance of management’s fiduciary defalcations. He 
instead stressed market and institutional limits on management discretion. 
Sufficient returns had to be directed to risk-bearing shareholders to keep 
the market receptive to new issues of shares. At the same time, because 
proxy fights made management power contestable, managers had to keep 
their “phlegmatic” shareholders reasonably contented.106 Accordingly, 
risk bearing capital did get a cognizable cut of pure profits. 
But who should receive the residual of the residual (termed “ex risk 
profit” by Means)? “The answer,” said Means, “must be sought in 
economic and social considerations.”107 He saw no reason to direct this 
wealth to the shareholders, who performed no further economic function 
after having been compensated for bearing risk. Applying economic logic, 
the scales thus apparently tipped in the managers’ direction. Since they 
were performing an economic function as they operated the firms, 
compensation with “ex risk profit” had an apparent incentive-based 
justification.108 
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Means rejected this economic logic,109 however, and redirected the 
discussion to the speculative territory on which he and Berle closed The 
Modern Corporation. The rejected logic only made sense on the classical 
assumptions that the profit motive would spur efficient production and that 
a competitive economy would effectively regulate the producers. 
Concentration of economic power negated both assumptions. In addition, 
there were diminishing returns on the management incentive side as ever-
larger profit sums would go into a smaller number of pockets. Meanwhile, 
concentration enhanced barriers to entry and diminished competitive 
control.110 
Means held open the ultimate question regarding the allocation of 
profits, closing with a question and a suggestion. The question was 
whether it was still plausible that the profit motive held out a socially 
effective method of inducing entrepreneurship.111 The implicit answer was 
no. As to what to do with ex-risk profits, maybe the question was whether 
such profits should be made at all, with managers being modeled not as 
entrepreneurs but as professionals with public duties.112 Whatever the 
answers to the many open questions, Means was certain of one thing—that 
his depiction of administered pricing and competition would provide 
essential assistance in the answers’ eventual derivation.113 
E. Comments 
Add all this up and one returns to The Modern Corporation with 
answers to many of its open questions. We now have a microeconomic 
basis for understanding the fifth assertion made in Book I, Chapter III: 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand no longer governed the economy because 
the power to price goods—indeed, the decision whether to produce the 
goods in the first place—now was vested in a small number of visible 
hands. The shift denuded price competition of its disciplinary effect, 
diluted the incentive effect of the profit motive, and perhaps most 
importantly, prevented the economy from self-correcting in the wake of a 
negative shock. 
Corporations, viewed against this dysfunctional microeconomic 
background, fairly could be characterized as social institutions—
institutions in obvious need of regulation. Furthermore, Means’s analysis 
handed a very specific directive to the regulator-to-be: figure out how to 
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manage the price in the interest of the economy as a whole rather than in 
the exclusive interest of the producing entity. 
The Modern Corporation would have made a lot more sense had the 
theoretical points in the thesis been included as the final chapter of Part I. 
Why were the points not included? Michael Wachter and I speculated that 
Berle, as an aspiring FDR Brains Truster vying against others to influence 
the policies to be articulated by a still-undecided future boss, would have 
been cautious about laying out a detailed policy program in public.114 A 
similar motivation could have been in play in regards to the discussion of 
administered pricing.115 Or, in view of the tentative nature of the policy 
assertions made in the much better articulated economics of the 
dissertation, perhaps Berle and Means were astute enough to know that 
they did not know the answers, just the direction of future inquiry. There 
also could have been ordinary editorial and authorial concerns. Means’s 
theory would have added to the book’s complexity while simultaneously 
attracting criticism and prompting skepticism. 
There may also have been a timing problem. The book was in press, 
with the final galleys submitted by the authors, by April 1932.116 The 
dissertation was submitted in the following year.117 Perhaps the traces of 
the dissertation that we see on pages 45 and 46 of the book reflect an earlier 
stage of the project, while the surviving dissertation draft displays the 
same ideas at a more mature stage of development. 
A comparison of the five points on pages 45 and 46 with the 
exposition in the dissertation supports this inference. Book I, Chapter III, 
point three—the increase in production for use rather than sale—does not 
reappear in the thesis, apparently having been replaced by the discussion 
of cost accounting and overhead. Interestingly, both points—production 
for use and cost accounting—are probative of a trend toward internal price 
administration and away from external market control. It seems that Means 
at some point decided that reference to accounting did the job better than 
reference to vertical integration. A similar association can be suggested 
between Book I, Chapter III, point four—the trend toward going concern 
over asset value—and the dissertation’s discussion of saving and 
investment. In this case, the comparison suggests considerable analytical 
                                                     
 114. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 8, at 120–22. 
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question as to how to restore the economy. See Means, Corporate Power, supra note 86, at 469. 
 116. Letter from Adolf Berle to Gilbert Montague (Apr. 20, 1932) (on file with the Franklin D. 
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advancement over time. The book’s emphasis on the primacy of going 
concern over asset value does suggest that large corporate producers have 
special characteristics. But one can think of qualifications: going concern 
value also exceeds asset value at a mom and pop store. Nor does the value 
point by itself show us that the classical picture no longer describes either 
pricing or incentives in a large corporation. The discussion in the 
dissertation accomplishes much, much more, identifying different markets 
for the same value source (one for assets and the other for going concern 
value), bringing in the separation of ownership and control to bear on 
Means’s pricing theory and pointing to concrete distortionary possibilities. 
One suspects, then, that the theory of the administered price 
remained at such an early stage of articulation as to preclude its inclusion 
in a book published in early 1932. In this scenario, Means’s chapter is 
missing because it was a rough work in process, or perhaps had not yet 
been written. But the omission might have occurred even if the dissertation 
draft had been on the table in early 1932. The presentation in the 
dissertation amounted only to a first crack at what would become for 
Means a monumental, career-long theoretical enterprise. There is no basis 
on which to infer that Means deemed the version in the dissertation ready 
for publication. 
III. WASHINGTON, 1933–1988 
Berle stayed in New York after Roosevelt’s inauguration in 1933, 
not having received an offer of a sufficiently important job in the new 
administration.118 Means, in contrast, went to Washington, where he 
remained the rest of his life. He first served as an economic advisor to the 
Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace. He also served on the National 
Recovery Association’s (NRA’s) Consumer Advisory Board. In 1935, he 
moved over to the Industrial Section of the Natural Resources Committee; 
finally, in the early 1940s, he worked at the Bureau of the Budget.119 He 
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left the government in 1943 and landed in the think tank sector, first as an 
associate with the Committee for Economic Development from 1943 to 
1958 and then with the Fund for the Republic from 1957 to 1959. He 
remained an entrepreneur: in 1951 he started a business raising and selling 
zoysia grass, an enterprise he continued until 1963, when he was 67 years 
old. He thereafter continued to consult and write until his death in 1988, 
at 91 years of age.120 
The one thing Means never did was take up an academic 
appointment. An outsider in his own profession, he never sought one.121 
Although he thought of himself as a macroeconomist, he tends to be 
remembered as an institutionalist.122 There are good reasons for the 
institutional appellation. Like Thorsten Veblen and the other 
institutionalists, he engaged in historical evolutionary analysis of the 
economy, and his explanations elevated institutional structure over 
external factors.123 As such, his period of greatest influence was during 
FDR’s first term, when the NIRA was put into place and planning 
correctives to free markets had their greatest prestige. 
It bears noting that Means and the other leading institutionalists in 
the administration, Rexford Tugwell and Mordecai Ezekiel, disapproved 
of the NIRA’s planning apparatus. The NIRA’s executory arm, the NRA, 
featured sectoral planning by private actors under public auspices.124 For 
Means and his cohort, coordination needed to be effected on an overall 
basis in a process free of domination by business people—they, after all, 
were the very administrators whose pricing decisions needed to be 
overruled.125 In Means’s more particular corporatist vision, a public 
agency should promulgate price and production policies generated as the 
balanced outcome of bargaining among representatives of business, labor, 
consumers, and government.126 
The NIRA’s collapse came at the expense of the institutionalists’ 
reputations. Planning had failed, and no one was interested in the even 
more invasive iteration they advocated.127 Moreover, neo-Keynesian 
economists were on the scene promising a less heavy-handed mode of 
economic correction. Keynes diagnosed the problem underlying the Great 
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Depression as a climate of weak investment incentives incident to the 
modern economy and prescribed a cure in the form of government 
stimulus of investment.128 Means’s period of influence ended abruptly in 
1939, when, after a sharp debate, the neo-Keynesian economist Alvin H. 
Hansen, who had an investment-based theory of secular stagnation, 
displaced him at the National Resources Planning Board.129 
Hansen’s Keynesianism would be eclipsed in turn in the post-war 
economic expansion—secular stagnation no longer made sense once 
people were moving to Levittown and watching Leave It to Beaver on their 
new televisions. Keynesians still ruled, but in a new fusion with orthodox 
economic theory. The economy was now deemed to be fundamentally 
sound, as had been the case before 1929, but also was deemed to need 
short-run fine tuning pursuant to a mechanistic formula.130 Means, whose 
central ideas remained in place through his adult life, drifted further into 
the wilderness.131 
Berle, in contrast, made a few crucial post-war adjustments and 
continued to occupy the national stage as a leading public intellectual.132 
He told a happy story. New Deal reforms had solved the accountability 
problem identified in The Modern Corporation.133 The management 
incentive problem was under control, even though managers remained 
insulated from capital market pressures.134 A big stick state watched over 
them instead.135 To keep the state at bay, managers were forced to keep the 
public satisfied with jobs and growth.136 Thus constrained, managers 
amounted to quasi-civil servants.137 We had, in effect, arrived at the higher 
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evolutionary plateau called for in Book IV, Chapter IV and the close of 
Means’s dissertation. 
Interestingly, Berle’s post-war descriptions of the economy 
amounted to notes on a lecture by Gardiner Means. Product markets, said 
Berle, were incomplete, and price did not match supply and demand. The 
industrial production machine, he asserted, could bring forth limitless 
goods138 but also presented persistent problems. Overcapacity gave 
management the discretion to set the level of production wherever it 
wanted; at the same time, labor tended toward oversupply. This led to an 
unpalatable either-or: either too many goods were produced or 
unemployment was too high. Market correction implied catastrophic 
fluctuations and intolerable costs: starvation for labor and bankruptcy for 
firms.139 The solution to the problem lay in a planned equation of supply 
to demand.140 Absent planning, asserted Berle, the economic conditions 
that had brought about the Depression would have recurred in the early 
1960s.141 A point of difference with Means opened up only at this point in 
the discussion. Means, as we have seen, had never been satisfied with the 
mode and character of federal price regulation. Berle was content with 
private planning in the industrial oligopolies142 accompanied by direct 
government intervention in the regulated industries.143 
The economic and political conditions that supported Berle’s 
sanguine political economy were fast disappearing at the time of his death 
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in 1971.144 Their complete disappearance in the stagflation of the 1970s145 
had negative implications for his posthumous reputation. He lingers in the 
memory more for The Modern Corporation and his work on corporate law 
than for the post-war political economy that made up his main body of 
work. Stagflation, which combined recession with inflation, also brought 
down post-war Keynesianism, a theory which had no way to explain it. 
Ironically, stagflation also meant vindication for Means, who did 
have a theory. Means had reemerged as a giver of Congressional testimony 
when inflation became a policy concern in the 1960s.146 He was also the 
first economist to identify and describe a bout of stagflation, a task 
performed in a Preface to the 1967 edition of The Modern Corporation.147 
The next generation—the post-Keynesian macroeconomists—would view 
him as a valued precursor.148 
IV. PALO ALTO, 1982 AND BEYOND 
Means took his ideas on stagflation to the Hoover Institution 
conference in 1982, combining them with reflections on The Modern 
Corporation and the Great Depression in a symposium piece that 
amounted to a reprise of the high points of a long, distinguished career. 
It was as if his Ph.D. dissertation was getting a new section to account 
for recent developments in practice. Means offered a two-part analysis. In 
the first part, Means explained why a rational manager might find it 
convenient to raise prices even as demand was falling—a practice he 
called “perverse pricing.”149 He sketched out various scenarios. In one 
case, a manager working with fixed costs, variable costs, and a total profit 
target sees demand and output fall. Raising the price makes sense so long 
as it facilitates attainment of the profit target.150 Alternatively, the manager 
is comfortable with a fall in demand because overcapacity deters new 
entrants even as a price increase protects return on capital.151 In a third 
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case, the price administrator at one firm puts through a raise and 
inflationary expectations cause the rest of the industry to follow.152 In all 
three cases the inflation occurs even as too little money is buying from 
well-stocked shelves rather than the classic inflationary case of too much 
money chasing too few goods.153 But the classic case could also occur in 
a stagflation context if corporate administrators raised employee pay 
absent a justificatory productivity increase.154 
But why should perverse pricing in one sector trigger economy-wide 
inflation in an economy experiencing falling demand? We proceed to the 
second part of the analysis and return to the duopolistic economy described 
in the dissertation. So long, said Means, as the classically competitive part 
of the economy outweighed the sector with administrative competition, 
most prices went down in a recession and a Keynesian program of 
monetary and fiscal correctives could work. But there was a tipping 
point—“the great divide”—at which the administratively competitive 
sector was large enough to cause more prices to go up than down despite 
a fall in demand. Inflation and recession would combine accordingly. It 
was a dangerous place to be, generating self-fulfilling inflationary 
expectations.155 
Means also had thoughts about what to do. He had a notion of a 
“natural” price. Perverse pricing occurred in a short-term frame as 
managers divided fixed costs and profit by current production volume. 
Long-term pricing would work better for the economy and get us closer to 
the natural price—fixed costs and profit would be divided by average 
projected output over a period of years.156 Means also was more moderate 
than he formerly had been in regard to implementation. He acknowledged 
that private planning had been known to succeed and projected that 
individual firms might well learn to correct their pricing practices and opt 
for a long-term approach.157 
What was moderate for Means must have sounded recklessly 
interventionist to the neoclassical economists gathered at Hoover in 
1982.158 The orthodox view of an inherently self-correcting economy, 
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dispatched to the wilderness for the half-century after 1932, was returning 
to the mainstream in response to the policy failures of the 1970s.159 Many 
of those responsible for its articulation as a theory of the firm—Demsetz, 
Fama, and Jensen—gave papers at Hoover.160 And those who would soon 
be responsible for the new theory’s cross-disciplinary arbitrage to law, 
Easterbrook and Fischel, were in the audience.161 
One suspects that Means was well able to handle himself, even in 
that crowd and at 85 years of age. Still, it was a moment of radical change 
going against everything he stood for. Not only was orthodoxy back and 
full of energy in the academic world, but 1982 was the year in which 
inflation finally started to fall and the stock market finally advanced 
beyond its early 1970s peak.162 The Reagan expansion was on and it finally 
solved the stagflation problem.163 Means’s theory of perverse pricing, an 
in-the-moment intervention only a year earlier, had suddenly become 
history. 
But there were twists and turns in store for the orthodox restoration 
as well, as least so far as concerned The Modern Corporation. The idea at 
the conference was to consign the separation of ownership and control to 
the dustbin of history on the occasion of its half century. The papers and 
comments were impressive and the participants doubtlessly left Palo Alto 
with a sense of a job well done. 
Easterbrook and Fischel thereafter successfully took the new 
orthodoxy to corporate legal theory, turning what was implicit in Jensen 
and Meckling’s original principal–agent model,164 along with the papers 
presented at Hoover, into a sequence of normative assertions. Their 
contractarianism offered an overarching account of successful market-
based control of corporate governance, an account that banished any 
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problems stemming from separated ownership and control.165 There 
followed a claim that the inherited governance regime was economically 
rational,166 and there should be a presumption against having any more 
corporate law than already exists.167 The account’s plausibility much 
depended on a vigorous takeover corrective. 
But hostile takeovers ceased in the wake of the economic collapse of 
1989 and failed to restart in tandem with economic recovery a couple of 
years later.168 A public choice story circulated to explain their 
disappearance. Managers seeking renewed insulation from the markets 
had gone to state legislatures and appealed to state judiciaries to promote 
anti-takeover statutes and otherwise validate takeover defensive 
measures.169 The defenses appeared to be effective. It followed that in the 
post-takeover era agency costs were chronically and suboptimally high, 
undercutting Easterbrook and Fischel’s market success story.170 Thus did 
the separation of ownership and control return to center stage as the 
problem that corporate law needed to solve, a late twentieth-century 
reenactment of Berle and Means’s Depression era reversal of orthodoxy. 
But the replay came with its own twist. Although a law reform agenda was 
implied, it was not a law reform agenda following from a diagnosis of 
irretrievable market failure. To the contrary, the idea was to clear barriers 
so that market control could finally be made to work. Agency cost 
reduction through shareholder empowerment was the goal, and process 
reforms were thought to be a necessary means to the end.171 
However, that diagnosis was itself upturned after the turn of this 
century, when hedge fund activists managed to overcome management 
insulation within the existing process context without the benefit of a law 
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reform assist.172 This was shareholder empowerment for real, and it came 
forth as a classic example of market correction. The correction was, of 
course, a long time in coming, but it was otherwise very much along the 
lines earlier predicted by Easterbrook and Fischel. It also implied yet 
another eclipse for Berle and Means. Gilson and Gordon accurately 
captured the moment when, in 2013, they observed that the separation of 
ownership and control has disappeared because shareholders now value 
(and exercise) their franchise to shape business policy.173 
CONCLUSION 
This essay recounts a succession of successes and comeuppances and 
comings and goings. First comes an external shock in the form of a Great 
Depression. Reacting to it, Berle and Means depose the reigning 
classicists, who querulously reject the theoretical part of Means’s 
dissertation on their way out. Berle and Means’s new corporatism then 
enjoys a brief ascendance but quickly implodes, compromising Means’s 
reputation and causing Berle to make major adjustments to stay relevant. 
Meanwhile, different sorts of Keynesians come and go in the background 
in response to the economy’s performance; ironically, their short runs of 
influence were built into the very theory they deployed. An external shock 
again disrupts things with the stagflation of the 1970s. This consigns Berle 
to history even as it briefly returns Means to center stage. But its primary 
beneficiaries turn out to be the new purveyors of classical orthodoxy, who 
promptly move to remove The Modern Corporation from the policy stage 
once and for all. That goal proves surprisingly difficult to accomplish and 
only comes about decades later as an incidental effect of a twenty-first 
century hedge fund investment strategy. 
The central actor in all of this is the economy, the performance of 
which consistently upends theories that ask too much in the way of 
coordination by its free market side or, alternatively, go too far in 
dismissing the free market’s corrective capacity. 
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